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AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS V. EPA:
THE PHOENIX ("SICK CHICKEN") RISES FROM
THE ASHES AND THE NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE IS REVIVED
David M. Richardson'
The constitutional doctrine of nondelegability-that Congress may not
delegate legislative powers-is grounded primarily in Article I, section 1
of the U.S. Constitution, which begins "[a]ll legislative Powers ... shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States."1 Although this clause im-
plicitly prohibits Congress from delegating its powers to others, federal
courts have been reluctant to invalidate federal regulations based on the
nondelegation doctrine.2 In fact, the Supreme Court has not quashed a
federal statute for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
since 1935.'
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court declared the granting of
broad discretionary power to the President unconstitutional in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States4 -the so-called "sick chicken"
case.' The Court ruled that Congress's failure to mandate standards to
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
2. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (explaining the non-
delegation doctrine's limited use by the federal judiciary during the past 60 years), cert.
granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257); see also WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 182 (8th ed. 1996) (recognizing the Supreme
Court's reluctance to invalidate federal statutes under the nondelegation doctrine).
3. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42, 550-51
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) after the Court con-
cluded that Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the President); see
also Randolph J. May, D.C. Circuit Decision Draws Needed Spotlight to Nondelegation
Doctrine, LEGAL TIMES, June 21, 1999, at 20 (arguing for the Court's return to Schechter
type decisions).
4. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
5. See id. at 541-42 (declining to recognize the Live Poultry Code as authorized un-
der section 3 of the NIRA); see also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-20,
430 (1935) (nullifying the President's power under section 9(c) of the NIRA to ban the
interstate shipment of petroleum); WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (3d ed. 1997) (referring to Schechter by its nickname, the "sick
chicken" case).
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guide the executive branch in its exercise of discretion would result in the
nullification of such delegations as unconstitutional.' Since 1935, the
Court has consistently upheld the delegation of broad rulemaking power
to federal agencies,7 including instances when the Court could not find
8any congressionally-prescribed standards whatsoever.
Although the courts have been reluctant to require stringent standards
from Congress since the "sick chicken" decision in 1935, 9 the. Uiited
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently revived the non-
delegation doctrine in American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA.10 In American
Trucking, a divided three-judge circuit panel found Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) rules, which established strict national air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act,' to be unconstitutional. 2 The EPA
promulgated the rules to reduce ground-level ozone and particulate mat-
6. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42 (articulating that Congress, in performing its
lawmaking responsibilities, may not delegate its authority without establishing standards
that limit administrative discretion); Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421 (declaring that
Congress may delegate only "to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by
the legislature is to apply").
7. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (upholding the crea-
tion of the United States Sentencing Commission, a quasi-judicial independent agency);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419, 426 (1944) (upholding the delegation of rule-
making power to a price administrator to control inflation by fixing the maximum prices
for various commodities); see also, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 79 (Johnny H.
Killian & Leland E. Beck eds., 1987) [hereinafter U.S. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS] (con-
cluding that the history of the nondelegation doctrine indicates that "the Court does not
really require much in the way of standards from Congress").
8. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 755-56, 783-87 (1968) (up-
holding a price fixing schedule developed by the Federal Power Commission for the natu-
ral gas industry, despite the lack of apparent statutory authority to enact such a rule);
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416-18,
421-22 (1967) (upholding an Interstate Commerce Commission rule that regulated trans-
portation services despite the agency's unsuccessful attempts to attain such authority from
Congress).
9. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Wjhile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unques-
tionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts.").
10. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257). See U.S.
CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 78 (recognizing that "the Court has in recent
years paid scant attention to delegation as a constitutional issue").
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (1994).
12. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
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ter (PM), commonly referred to as smog and soot.13 After reviewing the
EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act, the court concluded that the
agency's revised smog standards exceeded the scope of the Clean Air
Act and resulted in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
The full circuit supported the three-judge panel's nondelegation ruling
and denied the EPA's request for a rehearing en banc.' In January 2000,
the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of the EPA, peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to review the D.C. Circuit's decision." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in May 2000.7 If the Supreme Court
affirms the appellate court, American Trucking will impact considerably
the federal government's future efforts to implement broad regulatory
18
programs.
This Note examines the interpretive evolution of the nondelegation
doctrine from its origins to the present day. Part I of this Note presents a
concise exposition of notable cases that have guided the U.S. Supreme
Court, as well as the D.C. Circuit, in the development of this area of con-
stitutional and administrative law. Part II discusses the significant facts,
procedural history, and majority and dissenting opinions of American
Trucking, as well as its impact on prior law. Finally, Part III analyzes the
13. See id.; see also Margaret Kriz, Why the EPA's Wheezing a Bit, NAT'L J., July 24,
1999, at 2166 (reporting on the EPA's reasoning for promulgating broad air quality rules
and its reaction to the American Trucking decision).
14. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
15. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu-
riam) (denying the EPA's request for a rehearing en banc), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724
(U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257). The court did grant the EPA's petition for rehearing
in part and agreed to modify portions of the original opinion, which did not concern the
nondelegation doctrine. See id. at 8-10.
16. See id., petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
17. See id., cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 23, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
18. See Kriz, supra note 13, at 2167. There is a fair chance that the Supreme Court
will uphold the D.C. Circuit's decision considering the Court's recent innovations in other
constitutional issues, such as state sovereignty. See id; see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress violated the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereignty immunity rights when it empowered Indian tribes to sue states in
federal court); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress
exceeded its authority by intruding into the states' traditional prerogatives of policing its
citizens); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that Congress violated
the state sovereignty doctrine by requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct
criminal background checks on handgun purchasers); Maine v. Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 754
(1999) (declaring that states deserve constitutional protection from federal suits brought in
their courts). Over the last several years, the Court has declared, usually by simple majori-
ties, that there are constitutional limits to federal authority. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC
LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (Supp. 1998); see also infra notes 178-80 and ac-
companying text (analyzing the possible significance of the American Trucking decision).
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significance of American Trucking and argues that the D.C. Circuit's ap-
proach in revitalizing the nondelegation doctrine is a healthy develop-
ment that will lead to a more accountable federal bureaucracy and
strengthen the separation of powers doctrine in a workable manner.
I. A LOT OF TALK BUT LIT[LE AcTION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE PRIOR TO AMERICAN TRUCKING
A. Development of the Supreme Court's Nondelegation Doctrine
Jurisprudence
In 1935, the nondelegation doctrine underwent an important develop-
ment because, for the first time in history, the Supreme Court exercised
the doctrine to strike down two statutorily created federal programs-the
"Petroleum Code" and the "Live Poultry Code" of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). 9 Ironically, 1935 was also the last
year in which the Court used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a
federal statute."' The Court protected statutes consistently from non-
delegation attacks before and after it decided Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan" and Schechter in 1935.22 Some commentators have concluded that
19. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (striking down the
Petroleum Code as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935)
(nullifying the Live Poultry Code as an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's law-
making authority); see also National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 67, §§ 8-
9, 48 Stat. 195, 199-200 (1933).
20. See generally, May, supra note 3, at 20 ("The last time the Supreme Court held a
statute unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine was in 1935 in Schechter.").
21. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1911) (upholding a
delegation of rulemaking power to the Secretary of the Agriculture to issue permits for
livestock grazing on federal land); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 700 (1892) (upholding a
statute that gave the President the power to impose retaliatory tariffs); The Brig Aurora,
11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813) (upholding a trade statute that granted the President the power to
impose import restrictions); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 39 (4th ed. 1998) (introducing a history of significant Court deci-
sions that considered delegations of legislative power); cf Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the delegation of legislative
power to a quasi-judicial agency should be declared unconstitutional); American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority's decision to uphold the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
despite a broad delegation of rulemaking authority to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA)); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should have nulli-
fied portions of the OSH Act instead of a rule promulgated by OSHA); see generally supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text (citing examples of post-1935 case law in which the Court
[Vol. 49:10531056
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the Court's rejection of the nondelegation doctrine means that the doc-
trine is a dead letter. 3 Despite its nonuse before and after 1935, the non-
delegation doctrine remains good law, often cited by the federal judici-
ary2 and analyzed in numerous administrative law casebooks and
hornbooks!'
Chief Justice William Howard Taft receives credit for one of the doc-
trine's best articulations.26 According to Chief Justice Taft, Congress
may delegate its lawmaking functions to others only when it "shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
rejected nondelegation doctrine challenges to federal statutes).
23. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 5, at 50 ("Lawyers who now argue that statutes are in-
valid because they violate the non-delegation doctrine are probably wasting a great deal of
their client's time and money."); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 135 (1997) (describing
the nondelegation doctrine as "toothless"). But see C. Boyden Gray & Alan Charles Raul,
The Courts Thwart the EPA's Power Grab, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1999, at A26. Gray and
Raul filed briefs on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Tom Bliley in
American Trucking and stated that:
Contrary to much prevailing opinion among both journalists and lawyers, the
nondelegation doctrine is not some arcane, obscure and benighted legal relic of
the pre-New Deal era. The doctrine has been alive and well, serving primarily as
a canon of judicial construction to save otherwise overly broad statutory grants
or agency claims of legislative authority from being held unconstitutional.
Id.
24. See supra notes 7-8, 22 and accompanying text; infra notes 42-45 and accompa-
nying text (noting various federal cases decided before and after 1935 that considered
nondelegation doctrine challenges to federal laws).
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (providing a sample of legal commenta-
tors' opinions concerning the status of the nondelegation doctrine in present day constitu-
tional jurisprudence); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Ch. 1 (1992) (tracing the evolution of the federal judiciary's
treatment of the nondelegation doctrine); BREYER, supra note 22, at 39-49; RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §§ 3.4-3.4.4, at 47-56 (2d ed.
1992) (outlining Supreme Court case law pertaining to the nondelegation doctrine);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.14, at 56-57 (2d ed. 1991) (addressing
congressionally-prescribed standards and the need for agencies to comply with such stan-
dards); 1 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03, at 66-76 (1999) (review-
ing the Supreme Court's handling of the nondelegation doctrine); see generally DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 40 (1993) ("[Tlhe Court never explicitly reversed its
1935 decisions and it continued to articulate essentially the same verbal formulae defining
the scope of permissible delegation.").
26. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(regarding Chief Justice Taft's statement in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928), as a "more familiar" articulation of the nondelegation doctrine); U.S.
CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 76 ("The current formulation of the rule
[was] that laid down by Chief Justice Taft in 1928.").
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body authorized to [act] ... is directed to conform."27 Central to the de-
velopment of this doctrine is the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, which allocates lawmaking power to the legislative branch, law-
executing power to the executive branch, and law-interpreting power to
the judicial branch.28 Chief Justice Taft cautioned, however, that the
separation of powers doctrine should not be followed too literally, be-
cause all three branches are "co-ordinate parts of one government." 29
Each branch, in carrying out its responsibilities, may perform certain
tasks associated with the other two branches "in so far as the action in-
voked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of
another branch."3° In order to permit a delegation, the Chief Justice
wrote, "the extent and character of [the delegation] must be fixed ac-
cording to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmen-
tal co-ordination.,
3'
The nondelegation doctrine dates back to the seventeenth century
when John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government,32 borrowed the
27. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
28. See U.S. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 70-71 (explaining the origins
of the nondelegation doctrine). Separation of powers is defined as "[tihe division of gov-
ernmental authority into three branches of government ... each with specified duties on
which neither of the other branches can encroach[.]" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572
(Pocket ed. 1996). The Framers of the Constitution considered the division of three sepa-
rate and distinct branches as "essential to the preservation of liberty" since each branch
serves as a check on the power of the other two. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 159 (James
Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 2d ed. 1966); see J.A. CORRY, ELEMENTS OF
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 25-26, 33-37 (1947) (exploring the origins and importance
of the separation of powers doctrine). In J. W. Hampton, Chief Justice Taft explained the
importance of the nondelegation doctrine in upholding the integrity of the separation of
powers principle:
The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions of this country divide the gov-
ernmental power into three branches. The first is the legislative, the second is
the executive, and the third is the judicial, and the rule is that in the actual ad-
ministration of the government Congress or the Legislature should exercise the
legislative power, the President or the State executive, the Governor, the execu-
tive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power, and in carrying out
that constitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the National fun-
damental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the
President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its
members with either executive power or judicial power.
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
29. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 79 (Prometheus
Books 1986) (1691) ("The legislative [branch] cannot transfer the power of making laws to
any other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it can-
[Vol. 49:10531058
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maxim "delegatus non potest delegare"33 from agency law and applied it
to the study of government." In 1825, the Supreme Court first recog-
nized the doctrine as a legitimate constitutional principle when Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for the majority in Wayman v. Southard,35 set
boundaries for the types of delegations that the Constitution permitted.3
In Wayman, the Court addressed whether Congress impermissibly
delegated to the federal judiciary the power to establish rules of practice
within the federal court system.37 In upholding Congress's delegation,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[i]t will not be contended that Con-
gress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which
are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly dele-
gate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise it-
self.,
38
Chief Justice Marshall conceded that "[tihe line has not been exactly
drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely
regulated by the legislature itself[,] from those of less interest," which do
not.3 9 Chief Justice Marshall concluded, however, that when Congress
decides to delegate its responsibilities, it must first establish general pro-
visions to guide "those who are to act under such general provisions to
fill up the details."4 In Wayman, the Court noted that although some
delegations are appropriate, perhaps even necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the federal government, the Court's approval of such delega-
tions is contingent upon Congress retaining its primary responsibility of
making law. 1
not pass it over to others.").
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 347 (2d ed. 1910) (translating the phrase as "[a]
delegate cannot delegate").
34. See U.S. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 70. (expounding on the ori-
gins of the nondelegation doctrine and noting that John Locke applied the doctrine "as a
principle of political science").
35. 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
36. See idL at 42-43 (declaring that Congress may delegate to the executive and judi-
cial branches "powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative"). The Court further
stated that "Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may
rightfully exercise itself." Id. at 43; see also U.S. CONSTruTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7,
at 71-72 (discussing permissible congressional delegations).
37. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 21.
38. Id. at 42-43.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Id. (emphasis added)
41. Id. at 46-47 (declaring Congress's delegation of authority to federal courts as ap-
propriate); see also Fox, supra note 5, at 32 (noting that Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the proposition that an effective federal government requires a certain amount of delega-
20001 1059
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After Wayman, the Court shielded numerous statutes from delegation
attacks, especially when the delegated duties were mainly fact-finding in
nature.4 ' The Court upheld these statutes after it found that Congress
provided the executive branch with either "general rules,, 3 a "primary
standard," 44 or a "contingency 4 ' as a guide to fulfilling its responsibili-
ties.4 The delegations that the Court upheld, however, rarely applied to
the conduct of private persons or the implementation of federal domestic
policy.47  Instead, the delegations usually affected an agency's manage-
ment of public property" or the President's international policy preroga-• 49
tives. These delegations generally did not involve the large-scale regu-
tion); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 16 n.1 (observing that although early Court
decisions consistently upheld delegations of legislative authority, the approvals "were con-
tingent on Congress retaining a primary legislative power").
42. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892) (upholding the President's
power to impose retaliatory tariffs on imports from countries that imposed duties on
American goods); see generally, e.g., The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 382 (1813) (upholding the
President's authority to revive expired tariffs against Britain and France upon his determi-
nation that these two countries violated a neutral commerce statute). In Field, the Court
reasoned that Congress delegated to the President only the power to ascertain facts-
whether foreign governments imposed duties on American exports-rather than
legislative power. Field, 143 U.S. at 692-93.
43. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 215 (1912)
(finding that Congress's provision of "general rules for the guidance of the Commission,
leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred"
did not constitute a delegation of legislative authority to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission).
44. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) ("Con-
gress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative
officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and regula-
tions."); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (finding that the Tea Inspection
Act, which allowed the Secretary of Treasury to ban the importation of certain kinds of
tea, did not constitute a delegation of legislative power because of a "primary standard"
that bestowed upon the Secretary "the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative
policy declared in the statute").
45. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 386 (finding that Congress properly delegated to the
President power to impose retaliatory tariffs because the power depended on a "contin-
gency").
46. See Fox, supra note 5, at 33-34 (discussing the early history of the nondelegation
doctrine).
47. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 16 (finding the Court approved delega-
tions prior to the New Deal that "did not much involve private conduct within the domes-
tic sphere[,]" but instead involved "matters such as presidential authority in foreign affairs
or agency management of public property").
48. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1911) (upholding a delega-
tion of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to proscribe rules governing the private
use of federally-owned forest land).
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (providing examples of two cases in
which the Court upheld delegations granting the President broad discretionary power to
1060 [Vol. 49:1053
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lation of commercial industries'
Such was the case in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States," in
which Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, articulated the modem
standard governing delegation. At issue was whether Congress could
grant to the President the power to revise the tariff duties for certain im-
ports whenever the President determined it was necessary "to equalize
foreign and domestic competition in the markets of the United States."53
The Chief Justice declared that Congress may delegate such power to the
President as long as there is an "intelligible principle" set out in the ena-
bling statute to help guide the President in his decisions. The Court
found such a principle because the statute authorized the President to
revise tariff duties only when necessary to equalize the cost of production• • 55
among the United States and its foreign competitors.
The term "intelligible principle" has carried on to the present day and
represents the current formulation of the rule.56 The Court endorsed the
"intelligible principle" standard in 1935, when, in two separate instances,
it found an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
conduct foreign policy); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
401, 412-13 (1928) (upholding the power delegated to the President to adjust duties on
tariffs as constitutional); Buttfield, 192 U.S. at 496 (upholding the Secretary of Treasury's
power to regulate the importation of tea).
50. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 16 (distinguishing nineteenth century
cases and early twentieth century cases from those cases decided in 1935 and beyond).
Delegations before the New Deal era "did not generally pertain to broad-scale agency
regulation of domestic conduct." Id.
51. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
52. Id. at 409; see also supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (describing Chief
Justice Taft's articulation of the nondelegation doctrine).
53. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 411 (discussing the Tariff Act of 1922).
54. Id. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legisla-
tive action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
55. See id. The Court further reasoned that it would be impossible for Congress to
operate a tariff system that requires the constant adjustment of duty rates. See id. at 407.
Specifically, the Court stated that:
[C]ommon sense requires that in the fixing of such rates Congress may provide a
Commission . . .to fix those rates, after hearing evidence and argument con-
cerning them from interested parties, all in accord with a general rule that Con-
gress first lays down, that rates shall be just and reasonable considering the serv-
ice given, and not discriminatory.
Id. at 407-08.
56. See U.S. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 76 (describing the evolution
of the nondelegation doctrine and attributing its current formulation to Chief Justice
Taft).
57. See id. at 75-76 (describing how the Court applied the "intelligible principle" rule
to invalidate the two federal programs in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
2000]
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In Panama Refining, the first of these two cases, the Court found that
Congress's delegation of legislative power to the President was too broad
and unrestricted." The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, invalidated
the President's authority under section 9(c) of the NIRA 9 to prohibit the
interstate and foreign shipment of petroleum in excess of state quotas-
so called "hot oil"-because no standards existed to guide the President's
exercise of discretion.6° Congress apparently failed to articulate when
and under what circumstances the President should act to block the
shipment of "hot oil."6 The Court pointed to an executive order that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued to implement section 9(c)'s dele-
gation of authority to the Secretary of Interior, who was empowered to
create agencies and promulgate rules necessary for the vigorous en-
forcement of the Act's operative provisions.62 Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
the sole dissenter, disagreed by finding an "intelligible principle" in sec-
tion 1 of the NIRA, which listed numerous purposes for the many sec-
tions of the statute, including the elimination of unfair trade practices.63
Five months after Panama Refining, the Court ruled unanimously in
Schechter that section 3 of the NIRA, which provided the President
broad powers to regulate labor conditions and establish price standards
and trade practices for various industries, delegated too much legislative
power to the executive branch.64 In Schechter, Justice Cardozo agreed
295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)); see also
LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 2, at 182 (reiterating that the Court has not invalidated
federal legislation under the nondelegation doctrine since 1935).
58. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 433.
59. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195,
200 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1935)) (invalidated 1935).
60. See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430-31. The Court admonished Congress for
failing to establish an intelligible principle to guide the Executive's discretion:
As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Con-
gress has declared no policy, has established no standard, and has laid down no
rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.
Id. at 430.
61. U.S. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 75 (reasoning that the failure to
set such standards resulted in an unconstitutionally excessive and unconfined delegation of
legislative power).
62. See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 407 & n.2 (quoting Executive Order No. 6204
(July 14,1933)).
63. See id. at 435-36 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
64. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)
(holding that the President's power under section 3 of the NIRA to prescribe or approve
the regulation of various industries, without standards to channel his discretion, amounted
to an invalid exercise of legislative authority).
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with the Court 65 when it found an absence of standards to guide the
President's discretion.66 The Court declared it unconstitutional for Con-
gress to "delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfet-
tered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed" to
regulate a domestic industry.67
Justice Cardozo concurred and concluded that Congress's delegation
was "not canalized within banks that [kept] it from overflowing." ' Jus-
tice Cardozo referred to section 3 as "delegation running riot., 69 Justice
Cardozo believed the critical difference between Panama Refining and
Schechter stemmed from the fact that Congress did not confine section 3
"to any single act [or] to any class or group of acts identified or described
by reference to a standard., 70 Section 3 gave the President broad power
to identify impediments to the national economic recovery, and upon
discovery, to exercise equally broad discretion in implementing solutions
without ever seeking Congress's permission.7
By 1943, eight years after Schechter, President Roosevelt, by appoint-
ing more activist justices, changed the makeup of the Court.72 In 1936,
the new justices began to change the political dynamics of the Court as
evidenced by a line of decisions that expanded the use of the Commerce
Clause 3 in regulating economic areas that the federal government never
previously regulated.74
65. Id. at 551-52 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (distinguishing the instant case from the
NIRA provisions at issue in Panama Refining, which provided the President with unlim-
ited power to investigate and remove impediments to fair competition in trades and indus-
tries).
66. Id. (Cardozo, J., concurring). As Justice Cardozo did in Panama Refining, the
Court in Schechter searched the "Declaration of Policy" in section 1 of the NIRA for lan-
guage that sufficiently guided the President's discretion to approve or prescribe industry
codes. Id. at 534-39. The Court found that section l's "preface of generalities" was inade-
quate in properly steering the President's exercise of rulemaking authority. Id. at 537.
67. Id. at 537-38.
68. Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 553' (Cardozo, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 538.
72. See LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 2, at 1552 (listing these Justices and the dates
of their Senate confirmations). President Roosevelt appointed nine Supreme Court Jus-
tices between 1937 and 1943. See id.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [to] regulate
Commerce ... among the several States.").
74. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (upholding the
NLRB's authority under the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit "any unfair labor
practices"); see also Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 677, 680-82 (1946) (expounding on the monumental
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In one of those cases, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,75 the
so-called Networks Case,76 the Court upheld Congress's broad delegation
of rulemaking power to the Federal Communication Commission
(FCC).77 Justice Felix Frankfurter, recently appointed at the time and a
strong believer in the national government's ability to alleviate societal
ills, 78 wrote for the majority in supporting the FCC's authority to develop
broadcast licensing policies. 79 The FCC cited section 303 of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 as originally providing the general authority to
regulate the broadcast industry "as public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity requires[.]" 8 The Court supported this seemingly open-ended
delegation based on the pragmatic assumption that the "facilities of ra-
dio" may not be put to "the best practicable service to the community"
without federal regulation.1 In other words, progress demanded that the
FCC take decisive action on behalf of the nation, even if that required
substantive policymaking.2
By the late 1970s, the nondelegation doctrine was close to becoming, if
impact of the Jones & Laughlin decision on President Roosevelt's national economic re-
covery program and subsequent Court decisions that generally affirmed Congress's claims
of authority to regulate industry through the Commerce Clause).
75. 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (Networks Case).
76. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 19.
77. See Networks Case, 319 U.S. at 224 (concluding that the FCC had the authority to
regulate and overturn contractual agreements made by network companies and their local
broadcasting stations).
78. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 19 & n.22 (suggesting that Justice
Frankfurter believed "the best means of resolving social problems was not to leave them
to private solutions but to instead commit them to 'official national action"') (citing FELIX
FRANKFURTER, LAWMAKING AND POLITICS 308 (A. Macleish & E. Pritchard, Jr. eds.,
1962)).
79. See Networks Case, 319 U.S. at 225-26 (supporting the FCC's claim of regulatory
authority and quoting New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-
25 (1932), which held that "[t]he purpose of the Act, the requirements it imposes, and the
context of the public interest provision" provide standards that guided the FCC's regula-
tion of broadcast licensing arrangements).
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 216 (quoting the majority opinion in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)). Justice Frankfurter may have quoted Sanders Bros. out of con-
text to justify upholding such a broad delegation. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25,
at 19-20 nn.21-22, 21 nn.28-31 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter cited the opinion out of
context to further his view that society's ills are best solved by national government ac-
tion).
82. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 19, 21-22 (propounding that Justice
Frankfurter believed aggressive federal action should resolve national problems and not-
ing that the Networks Case may be the only instance where the Court approved an "open-
ended delegation" of rulemaking authority to an agency).
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it had not already, an antiquated constitutional principle.83 A long line of
Court cases staved off nondelegation attacks by following the logic used
in the Networks Case.84 By the early 1980s, however, the delegation doc-
trine began to resurface.85 In two separate opinions, then Associate Jus-
tice William Rehnquist suggested that the Court revive the doctrine as an
attempt to induce Congress to make better law and enact fewer vague
enabling statutes."' Justice Rehnquist first articulated this view in Indus-. 87
trial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, the so-called
83. See Fox, supra note 5, at 38 ("Between 1936 and the late 1970s, the non-
delegation doctrine was certainly a dormant, if not a dead, issue."). For nearly forty years,
the Court consistently upheld congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to federal
agencies, despite an occasional concern that a statute may be too vague. See id.
84. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-42
(1974) (upholding the FCC's authority to impose surcharges on community antenna tele-
vision systems and declaring that the primary purpose of the FCC "is to safeguard the
public interest in the broadcasting activities of members of the industry"); Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (holding that the statute that authorized the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board to regulate building and loan associations did not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative functions because regulation of the banking industry is a long-
established government practice necessary to protect the public interest); see also, e.g.,
AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 22 (observing that between the mid-1930s and the
late 1970s, the Court approved a number of delegations "while disapproving of none"). It
should be noted, however, that the Court has probably never considered a delegation as
broad as the one endorsed in the Networks Case. See id. ("IT]he Networks Case seems to
be the only case where the Supreme Court has approved (or, more accurately, helped con-
struct) an entirely open-ended delegation.").
85. See Fox, supra note 5, at 38 (explaining when and how the nondelegation doc-
trine began to rematerialize in Court opinions).
86. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88
(1980) (Benzene) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The author recognizes that Chief Justice
Rehnquist served as an Associate Justice at the time of the Benzene decision. The author
will refer to Chief Justice Rehnquist as "Justice Rehnquist" throughout the remainder of
this Note. Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine
as a means of "ensuring that Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices
of social policy to politically unresponsive administrators." Id. at 686-87 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). Justice Rehnquist reiterated his call for the revival of the nondelegation doc-
trine in American Textile Manufactures Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, partially as a means to
provoke Congress into making critical policy decisions instead of abdicating its responsi-
bilities to the agencies. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (comparing the
Court's historic treatment of the nondelegation doctrine with relatively recent dissenting
opinions by Supreme Court Justices, including Justice Rehnquist); see generally Fox, su-
pra note 5, at 38 (explaining Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Benzene in greater
depth); BREYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 65 (explaining Justice Rehnquist's logic in Ben-
zene and Donovan as stating that a revival of the nondelegation doctrine would encourage
more congressional accountability).
87. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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Benzene case. 8
In Benzene, the Court refused to strictly apply the nondelegation doc-
trine to nullify portions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act).89 Although the Court held that Congress must provide some stan-
dards in its enabling statutes in order to limit the unbridled discretion of
executive agencies, 90 the majority struck down only a regulation issued by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) instead of
the statute itself.91 The OSH Act delegated to OSHA powers to "as-
sure[], to the extent feasible,.., that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health or functional capacity." 92 OSHA used this authority
to promulgate a regulation requiring companies "to limit benzene in the
workplace to no more than one part benzene in one million parts of
air."93 Industry groups challenged the rule as arbitrary, excessively costly
for compliance, and beyond OSHA's delegated authority under the OSH
Act.94
A majority of the Court agreed with the industry9 5 and overturned the
rule.96 Only Justice Rehnquist opted to nullify the Act.97 Concurring, the
88. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 24 & n.43 (referring to the case as Ben-
zene); see also Fox, supra note 5, at 38 (commenting on how Justice Rehnquist's concur-
ring opinion in Benzene shocked the legal community).
89. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 646 (warning that the OSH Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651
(1994), came close to providing a "'sweeping delegation of legislative power"' that the
Court could not have ignored (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935))).
90. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 645-46 (warning that the Court could have found sec-
tions 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine
if the Administration had successfully argued that these sections provided OSHA with the
broad authority to regulate industry).
91. See id. at 614-15, 645-46 (construing the statute to avoid finding an open-ended
delegation); see infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (explaining why the Court de-
cided to construe the OSH Act narrowly to avoid finding a delegation violation).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
93. AMAN & MAYTON, supra, note 25, at 24.
94. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 628-29 (recognizing the high compliance costs); see also
AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 24 (summarizing one argument against the legality of
OSHA's benzene rule, which contended that attaining the prescribed level of benzene
would result in disproportionately high costs for the industry).
95. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 645 (explaining that "the Government's theory would
give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible
benefit").
96. See id. at 614-15 (5-4 decision).
97. See id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("We ought not to shy away from our
judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of
concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the
pre-New Deal era.").
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future Chief Justice expressed concern about the Act's "to the extent
feasible" language, which he interpreted as an open-ended invitation for
OSHA to legislate, resulting in an unconstitutional delegation of Article
I power.98 Justice Rehnquist joined the plurality of four99 who found
OSHA's authority to regulate benzene canalized by other provisions of
the OSH Act,. including the requirement that OSHA find "a significant
health risk" to workers.' ° Thus, because OSHA failed to cite a signifi-
cant risk of harm from such low levels of benzene, the Court invalidated
the regulation instead of the statute.'0 ' The Court ultimately avoided the
nondelegation issue by construing the OSH Act to find an intelligible
principle within its ambiguous language." This finding limited OSHA's
discretion in promulgating expansive rules.'0 3
98. Id. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
99. See id. at 611. (Chief Justice Burger, as well as Justices Stewart and Powell,
joined Justice Stevens, who announced the judgment of the Court).
100. Id. at 614-15 (finding that section 3(8) of the OSH Act requires the Secretary of
Labor "to find, as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a signifi-
cant health risk in the workplace"); see also id. at 646 (concluding that section 3(8) ade-
quately confines OSHA's discretion to implement health and safety standards in the
workplace).
101. See id. at 646. According to Justice Stevens,
In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that
Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented power over Ameri-
can industry that would result from the Government's view of §§ 3(8) and 6(b)(5)
If the Government were correct in arguing that neither § 3(8) nor § 6(b)(5) re-
quires that the risk from a toxic substance be quantified sufficiently to enable the
Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable way, the statute
would make such a "sweeping delegation of legislative power" that it might be
unconstitutional under the Court's reasoning in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. A construction of the statute
that avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.
Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
102. See id. at 646. The Court interpreted section 3(8) of the OSH Act to require "a
threshold finding . . . that significant risks are present." Id. at 642; see also American
Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (analyzing the Benzene decision
and comparing it to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257); infra note 189 and accompanying text
(explaining that the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking announced that Chevron now re-
quires agencies, not the courts, to find an intelligible principle in an ambiguous statute).
103. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 25 (analyzing the plurality's logic in up-
holding the OSH Act but striking down the benzene regulation). Professors Aman and
Mayton provide a useful analysis of the plurality's logic:
This statutory interpretation was shaped by the delegation doctrine, the doctrine
operating as a canon of interpretation. The plurality explained that if the Act did
not "requir[e] that the risk from a toxic substance be quantified sufficiently to
enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable way,
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B. D.C. Circuit's Treatment of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The seeds of the D.C. Circuit's recent holding in American Trucking
can be traced to its 1991 International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space & Agricultural Implement Workers v. OSHA1°4 decision, better
known as Lockout/Tagout 105 In Lockout/Tagout I, the court regarded
an OSHA regulation, which governed the "Control of Hazardous Energy
Sources (Lockout/Tagout),"1' 6 as "so broad as to be unreasonable."'o
Unlike the Court in Benzene, the D.C. Circuit complained less of
OSHA's broad use of the delegated authority and more about OSHA's
inconsistent and variable application of its authority.' According to the
court, the cost of complying with the rule would vary from firm to firm
and from industry to industry °9 The court argued that the rule "would
give the executive branch untrammeled power to dictate the vitality and
even survival of whatever. segments of American business it might
choose.' '. Instead of striking down the regulation as an unconstitutional
delegation, the court remanded the rule back to OSHA for
reformulation in order to comply with the nondelegation doctrine."' The
the statute would make such a 'sweeping delegation of legislative power' that it
might be unconstitutional."
Id. (quoting Benzene, 448 U.S. at 646); see also BREYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 65 & n.4
(finding that the Court specifically construed the OSH Act to avoid finding a violation of
the nondelegation doctrine); Jennifer Cohen, Note, The Scope of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine As Applied to OSHA's "Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout)"
Regulation, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1996) (exploring the Court's application
of the nondelegation doctrine before its decision in International Union v. OSHA., 37 F.3d
665 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
104. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Lockout/Tagout I).
105. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(comparing the claim of regulatory authority in American Trucking with the authority as-
serted in Lockout/Tagout 1), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257); see also News from the Circuits, 24
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS. 6, 6 (1999) (asserting the D.C. Circuit's American Trucking de-
cision closely followed the court's logic in Lockout!Tagout I).
106. Control of Hazardous Energy Sources, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,644 (1989) (codified as 29
C.F.R. § 1910.147 (1995)). Lockout and tagout are two safety procedures designed to pro-
tect workers from injuries caused by electrical tools and industrial machinery. See Lock-
out!Tagout 1, 938 F.2d. at 1312.
107. Lockout!Tagout 1, 938 F.2d. at 1313.
108. See id. at 1318 (declaring an agency is not free to single out a particular company
for standards embodying strict compliance while applying a lesser standard for similar
situated companies).
109. See id. ("[T]he power to vary the stringency of the standard is the power to decide
which firms will live and which will die.").
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1313 (remanding the rule on Lockout/Tagout to the Secretary of Labor
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court directed OSHA to cite a principle within the OSH Act to confine
its discretion.12  In addition, the court took the additional step of sug-
gesting that the agency use a cost-benefit analysis to modify the rule. 3
In a separate concurrence, Judge Stephen F. Williams argued that
OSHA's use of a cost-benefit analysis would likely produce a rule that is
less stringent, but not necessarily less effective in enhancing workplace
safety.1
4
In 1994, the D.C. Circuit eventually upheld a revised rule mandating
lockout/tagout safety procedures in International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. OSHA."' In re-
sponse to the court's decree, OSHA supported its earlier rule by issuing
a supplemental statement of reasons in 1993."6 Thus, four years after its
original Lockout/Tagout decision, the court concluded that OSHA pro-
vided adequate justifications for its new industry-wide standards and
lockout preferences and upheld the entire modified rule."7
The D.C. Circuit's Lockout/Tagout I decision departed significantly
to develop a more reasonable interpretation of the OSH Act).
112. See id. at 1313, 1325.
113. See id. at 1320-21 (holding that OSHA's use of a cost-benefit analysis is a "per-
missible interpretation" of the OSH Act). "[C]ost-benefit analysis entails only a system-
atic weighing of pros and cons." Id. at 1321.
114. See id. at 1326 (Williams, J., concurring) (arguing that a cost-benefit analysis
could impose less burdensome requirements on industries and simultaneously protect the
health and well being of their employees). Judge Williams wrote the majority opinion of
the court, as well as a separate concurrence. See id. at 1312, 1326.
115. 37 F.3d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Lockout/Tagout II) (decreeing OSHA's rein-
terpretation of its statutory authority complies with the nondelegation doctrine).
116. See Coptrol of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612
(1993) (providing a "supplemental statement of reasons" for the issuance of its rule gov-
erning lockout/tagout procedures). The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit summarized OSHA's supplement as follows:
The agency points primarily to several principles-most of them not derived
from § 3(8) itself but from other sections, including some not directly applicable,
such as § 6(b)(5)-that constrain its discretion in choosing a safety standard. The
agency must find that (1) "the standard will substantially reduce a significant risk
of material harm"; (2) & (3) compliance will be economically and technologically
feasible; and (4) the standard "employs the most cost-effective protective meas-
ures". In addition, it must (5) for any standard differing from an existing national
consensus standard, publish its reasons why its standard would better effectuate
the purposes of the Act; and (6) support its choice of standard with evidence in
the rulemaking record and explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.
Lockout!Tagout H, 37 F.3d at 668 (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,614) (citations omitted).
117. Lockout/Tagout 11, 37 F.3d at 669 (holding that OSHA satisfied the nondelega-
tion doctrine when it construed its enabling statute as the governing authority to establish
industry safety); see also Cohen, supra note 103, at 1143 (analyzing the Lockout/Tagout II
decision).
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from some earlier district court holdings, including Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally,18 which upheld the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970."9 In Amalgamated Meat, the District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the statute sufficiently established a
standard to guide the President's discretion as it prescribed a norm of
stabilization2 ° and included a specific time limit within which the Presi-
dent could exercise authority to battle inflation.' The district court
warned, however, that the President and his administration should set
some administrative standards to guide the President's discretion.1
2
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT ADDS TEETH TO THE NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS V. EPA
In American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,'23 a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declared as unconstitutional new
EPA regulations that established strict national ambient air quality stan-
dards (NAAQS) for many communities found to have unacceptable lev-
els of smog and soot. By a two-to-one majority, the D.C. Circuit held
that the EPA construed the pertinent Clean Air Act provisions "so
118. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1988). The Economic Stabilization Act, an anti-inflation statute,
granted the President the broad power to freeze wages and prices nationally. See Amal-
gamated Meat, 337 F. Supp. at 763. According to the three-judge district court, led by D.C.
Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal, "the extremist pattern then before the Court [in Schech-
ter] cannot fairly be analogized to the anti-inflation statute, limited in life and passed in a
context of experiences with similar legislation, that is before us for consideration." Id. at
742-743, 763.
120. See Amalgamated Meat, 337 F. Supp. at 757-58 (finding the statute provides "a
standard of broad fairness and avoid[s] gross inequity" that limits the President's control
over the domestic economy).
121. See id. at 754 (citing the limited time frame-only six months with two extensions
of three-and-one-half months and two months, respectively-for the President to use his
stabilization authority under the Act).
122. See id. at 763 (stating clearly that the President is limited in his discretion because
"[t]he presumption must be that Congress, in vesting power in the President, contem-
plated only such further delegation as would be consistent with law"). Limits to the Presi-
dent's discretion "includ[ed] the requirement that the orders providing for stabilization be
issued on a basis that accords with general fairness and avoids gross inequity, and provide
for administration and procedures that are meaningfully consistent with that standard."
Id. The district court preceded this warning, however, by stating that the federal judiciary
would invalidate a statute for an unconstitutional delegation only in "the extremist in-
stance." Id. at 762.
123. 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
124. See id. at 1034; see also Kriz, supra note 13, at 2166.
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loosely as to render them unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power."'5 Although the court did not nullify any part of the Clean Air
Act or vacate the EPA's regulations, it declared the new air standards
unenforceable and remanded them to the EPA for reformulation. 126 Ac-
cording to the court, the EPA failed to articulate an "intelligible princi-
ple" on which to base its construction of the Clean Air Act in order to
limit, its discretion in determining the level of intolerable air pollution.127
The EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act left the agency "free to
pick any point between zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding
London's Killer Fog."'1
The majority opinion was divided into four parts. 29 Judge Stephen
Williams wrote Part I, which invalidated the EPA's rules on ozone and
PM standards.'9 Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg wrote the second part,
which rejected the petitioners' claims that the NAAQS revisions violated
several federal statutes, including the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. 3 Judge Ginsburg and Judge Williams wrote the third portion of the
decision, which required the EPA to consider the public health benefits
of ozone.32 Finally, Judge David S. Tatel and Judge Ginsburg co-
authored Part IV and concluded that the EPA's standards concerning a
certain type of PM were arbitrary and capricious.'33 Judge Tatel also
wrote a separate dissenting opinion to Part I, which argued that the ma-
jority largely ignored the Supreme Court's nondelegation doctrine juris-
125. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034.
126. See id. at 1033 (holding that the EPA when it promulgated its rules under the
Clean Air Act, failed to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine). Unlike the Supreme Court in
Benzene, the court of appeals did not find an intelligible principle within the Clean Air
Act and instead ordered the EPA to construe the Act on its own. See id. at 1038; see also
infra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining the role of agency deference in deter-
mining whether a statute contains an intelligible principle).
127. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 ("EPA lacks ... any determinate crite-
rion for drawing lines [because it] failed to state intelligibly how much is too much.").
128. Id. at 1037.
129. See id. at 1033.
130. See id. at 1033, 1034-40. Judge Ginsburg joined this part of the opinion. See id. at
1033.
131. See id. at 1033,1040-45.
132. See id. at 1033, 1045-53. Judge Ginsburg wrote Part III.A and Judge Williams
authored Part I1I.B. See id. at 1033. The D.C. Circuit subsequently modified Part III.A of
its opinion concerning the power of the EPA to enforce a revised primary and secondary
ozone NAAQS. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
133. See id. at 1033, 1053-55.
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prudence when it vacated the EPA's revised air quality standards.3
A. Revising the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
Ozone
The Clean Air Act of 1970 requires the EPA to establish, review, and
adjust NAAQS periodically for every pollutant that the EPA Adminis-
trator identifies to be harmful to public health and welfare.' The Clean
Air Act directs the Administrator to identify and set air quality criteria
for certain pollutants that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare."' 36 For each pollutant, the Administrator must
establish both a "primary standard"-a concentration level necessary to
protect the pubic health with "an adequate margin of safety"' 7-and a
"secondary standard" necessary to protect the public welfare.138
In July 1997, the EPA issued two final rules that revised the primary
and secondary standards for both ozone and particulate matter (PM).
39
The revised NAAQS for ozone replaced the previous standard with a
tougher one designed to protect against longer exposure periods. 40 The
EPA proposed a similarly strict revision of the NAAQS for PM. 4' The
134. See id. at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's opinion as
poorly reasoned in light of a half-century of nondelegation jurisprudence by the federal
judiciary).
135. See Clean Air Act §§ 108-09, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (1994). Currently, the EPA has
NAAQS for six common air pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide,
sulfur oxides, and particulates. See JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN, CLEAN
AIR ACT: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.3 (Supp. 1998).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
137. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
138. Id. § 7409(b)(2). The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to promote air quality
standards because "the attainment and maintenance of [such standards] in the judgment of
the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisites to protect the public health." Id. § 7409(b)(1).
139. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter PM Final Rule]; National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter Ozone Final Rule].
140. See Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859 (explaining that the previous stan-
dard of 0.12 parts per million (ppm) one-hour primary ozone was replaced with a standard
of 0.08 ppm eight-hour primary).
141. See PM Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652. In its final rule regarding PM, the
EPA explained the following changes:
Two new PM,.5 standards are added, set at 15 pg/m 3, based on the 3-year average
of annual arithmetic mean PM2.5 concentrations from single or multiple commu-
nity-oriented monitors, and 65 pg/m3 based on the 3-year average of the 98th
percentile of 24-hour PM,5 concentrations at each population-oriented monitor
within an area; and the current 24-hour PMo standard is revised to be based on
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EPA claimed that these revised NAAQS would protect 125 million
Americans, including thirty-five million children, from breathing in
harmful air and would "prevent approximately 15,000-premature deaths,
about 350,000-aggravated asthma attacks, and nearly a million cases of
significantly decreased lung function in our children."'42
Conversely, under these revised rules, many previously unaffected
communities throughout the United States would have been classified as
an "ozone nonattainment zone.', 43 An ozone nonattainment zone is a
geographic area, generally surrounding an urban center "that persistently
fails to meet the NAAQS" for ozone.4 The EPA's revised NAAQS
would increase the number of nonattainment zones beyond those cur-
rently designated in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.
45
The implementation of an eight-hour ozone standard within both new
and existing nonattainment areas would burden industries with expensive
the 99th percentile of 24-hour PM,, concentrations at each monitor within an
area.
Id.
142. EPA's Clean Air Regulations and Agriculture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 105th Cong. 15 (1997) (statement of Hon. Carol M.
Browner, Administrator, EPA).
143. Douglas E. Cloud & Charles S. Conerly, Haze of Uncertainty: Recent D.C. Circuit
Ruling Delays New EPA Ozone Standards, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 1999, at S29 (explain-
ing the practical effects that EPA's revised NAAQS would impose on small-to-midsize
urban areas). The authors suggested that "[m]etropolitan areas as diverse as West Mem-
phis, Ark., Augusta, Ga., Jerseyville, Ill., and Fayetteville, N.C., were likely candidates for
the new list of cities with smog problems." Id. Representative John Dingell (D-MI),
Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Commerce, charged that hun-
dreds of communities would be classified as nonattainment areas under the EPA's revised
ozone NAAQS:
Based on data from EPA and EPA past practices, we can expect at least 540
counties will fail to meet the new ozone standard, and some 280 will fail to meet
the fine particle standard. Those areas will then have to identify every source
and apply stringent controls and restrictions. EPA, in its own materials on the
standards, refers to the "stigmata" of noncompliance and the "burdensome plan-
ning requirements and restrictions on growth" that flow from being out of com-
pliance.
The Impact of EPA's New Air Quality Standards on U.S. Small Manufacturing Jobs and
Competitiveness: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mfg. & Competitiveness of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 105th Cong. 13 (1997) [hereinafter Testimony of
Rep. Dingell] (testimony of Rep. John Dingell).
144. Cloud & Conerly, supra note 143, at S29 (explaining the parameters of ozone
nonattainment areas); see also GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE
CLEAN AIR AcT OF 1990 123, 125 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the various categories of
ozone nonattainment areas created under Title I of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act of 1970).
145. See Cloud & Conerly, supra note 143, at S29 (describing the arguments against
the implementation of stricter air quality standards).
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and lengthy compliance and permitting programs. '  For these reasons,
various business groups challenged the EPA's regulations and filed peti-
• 141
tions for review with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which has ju-
risdiction over federal regulatory cases.
146. See id. Estimates vary on the anticipated costs to the industry in complying with
the revised NAAQS. The Washington Times published an editorial the day after the D.C.
Circuit's decision, suggesting that the revised PM and ozone NAAQS would have sub-
jected certain areas to "strict new emissions controls on automobiles, industry and busi-
ness at costs of $60 billion annually or more, according to the [P]resident's own Council of
Economic Advisers." EPA, Lost in the Ozone Again, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at
A18. Congressman John Dingell, who testified before a Senate panel reviewing the
promulgated clean air rules, supported this conclusion when he stated:
Mr. Chairman, no one has claimed it will be cheap to implement the new stan-
dards. There has been a lot of criticism of EPA's estimates, even by the Presi-
dent's own Council of Economic Advisors. While the EPA's Regulatory Impact
Analysis estimates compliance costs at $47.3 billion per year, the Council esti-
mates the cost of full compliance just for ozone to be as much as $60 billion per
year.
A study completed this summer by the WEFA Group (formerly the Wharton
Econometrics Forecasting Association) took into account many of the analyses
and associated data which have been conducted in the last nine months. This
study concluded that national compliance costs of $90-150 billion per year are
reasonable.
Testimony of Rep. Dingell, supra note 143, at 13. The Los Angeles Times, however, re-
ported that "government authorities said [the revised NAAQS for ozone] would cost
businesses and local governments nearly $10 billion to comply with the new rules by
2010." Robert L. Jackson & James Gerstenzang, Air Quality Standards Rejected by Ap-
peals Court, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1999, at Al; see also Ben Lieberman, Clearing the Air on
Regulatory Excess, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A16 (claiming the revised NAAQS for
ozone "would impose annual costs in excess of benefits-by as much as $8 billion dollars
under one set of assumptions"); Democracy 1, Tyranny 0, DET. NEWS, May 18, 1999, at
10A (editorializing that the cost of complying with the EPA rule was estimated at $5 bil-
lion, in addition to "the $35 billion annual cost the Clean Air Act already imposes").
147. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1031-33 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(per curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (indicating that the industry groups
that challenged the regulations included the Small Business Survival Committee, the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, the American Petroleum Institute, and the American
Trucking Associations), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
148. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1994) (providing the D.C. Circuit with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over final regulatory actions by the EPA concerning emission stan-
dards, provided that such actions are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect"); see also Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial economy and fair-
ness to the litigants by taking advantage" of the court's expertise concerning the regula-
tory actions it reviews); Kriz, supra note 13, at 2167 (stating that the D.C. Circuit has
"primary jurisdiction over federal regulatory cases").
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B. Recognizing the Limits to Rulemaking
In American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit held, in part,49 that the con-
struction of the Clean Air Act, on which the EPA relied to refashion its
ozone and PM NAAQS, was so broad and unconfined as to render the
EPA's authority an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.' ° In
remanding the revised NAAQS to the EPA for the development of a
narrower construction of the Clean Air Act, the court not only breathed
new life into a scarcely used constitutional doctrine, 5' but cast a thick
cloud over the constitutionality of Congress's future delegations of broad
rulemaking authority.
152
149. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. Another significant holding of American
Trucking focused on the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. See id. The court pre-
cluded the EPA from enforcing its revised primary NAAQS for ozone because, as cur-
rently written, they do not follow the mechanisms prescribed in the 1990 amendments. See
id. at 1046. Although the 1990 amendments did not alter sections 108 and 109, they did set
forth five different classifications of nonattainment areas, all measured under the 0.12
ppm, 1-hour primary ozone standard. See id. at 1046 & nn.6-7; see also Cloud & Conerly,
supra note 143, at S29 (analyzing the impact on the EPA's ability to revise the primary
NAAQS for ozone in light of the amendments).
The holding seems to suggest that the EPA can never stray from the current primary
standards for ozone, unless the agency requests the legislation to do so. See id. at S29
(concluding "[a] fair reading ... suggests that under current statutory mandates the EPA
can never enforce or implement a new primary ozone standard that varies from the current
one-hour standard"). The court also concluded that the EPA's NAAQS for PMO were
arbitrary and capricious because the agency "consider[ed] factors unrelated to public
health," which is the only issue under the Clean Air Act for the agency to consider.
American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1054-55. The court referred to its previous holding in Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which
held that appropriate levels of safety "must be based solely upon the risk to health." Id.
(quoting National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (in banc), the so-called Vinyl Chloride case).
150. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034.
151. See supra notes 7-9, 83-86 and accompanying text (commenting that since 1935
the federal judiciary has only paid lip-service to the nondelegation doctrine).
152. See Gray & Raul, supra note 23, at A26 ("The decision could have far-reaching
implications for all government rulemaking."); Kriz, supra note 13, at 2166-67 (calling
American Trucking a "potentially far-reaching decision" that "could call into question ac-
tions taken by other federal agencies to which Congress has given broad regulatory discre-
tion."); May, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that the court's holding was a good one and nec-
essary for the government to become more accountable); supra notes 7-9, 83-86 and
accompanying text. The decision did not escape the attention of the nation's leading
newspapers, some of which supported the decision while others opposed it. See, e.g., Bad
Decision on Clean Air, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,1999, at A22 (arguing that the case
"could threaten a series of other clean-air initiatives ... and overturn a half-century of ju-
risprudence that has allowed Congress to delegate important rule-making powers to
[f]ederal agencies"); Democracy 1, Tyranny 0, supra note 146, at 1OA (praising the deci-
sion, which "could curb the regulatory excesses that so encumber the U.S. economy-and
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In examining the constitutionality of the EPA's construction of the
Clean Air Act, the Court first determined whether the agency articulated
an "intelligible principle" that channeled its discretion to set air quality
standards. '53 The court quickly concluded that no such principle could be
found in the promulgated rules.' The court pointed to EPA findings
that showed "ozone definitely, and PM likely, as non-threshold pollut-
ants, i.e., ones that have some possibility of some adverse health impact
(however slight) at any exposure level above zero."'5 The court found
that the EPA had an unrestrained ability to set NAAQS for ozone and
PM at any level above zero because any concentration of ozone or PM
could be outside the "adequate margin of safety. 156 For instance, the
court remained unconvinced that the EPA's revised 0.08 ppm ozone
American lives"); Red Light for Regulators, Editorial, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1999, at A26
(celebrating the return of the nondelegation doctrine and the American Trucking decision
and its possible "far-reaching effects").
153. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034; see also supra notes 52-56 and accom-
panying text (discussing the development and application of the "intelligible principle"
standard).
154. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (agreeing with business petitioners that
the EPA construed the relative portions "of the Clean Air Act so loosely as to render
them unconstitutional delegations of legislative power"). In the EPA's petition to the full
D.C. Circuit for rehearing, the agency argued that the Clean Air Act provided an ade-
quate intelligible principle: "'The levels [set in a NAAQS] must be necessary for public
health protection: neither more nor less stringent than necessary."' American Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting the EPA Petition for
Rehearing at 8), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257). The
full circuit rejected the EPA's argument and declared that although the EPA claimed to
have put forward an intelligible principle (something that the agency failed to do when it
was before the three-judge panel), the EPA still failed to explain how the principle limited
its discretion and guided the agency's decision-making process. See id. at 6-7. The court
concluded that "[w]e express no opinion upon the sufficiency of that principle; only after
the EPA itself has applied it in setting a NAAQS can we say whether the principle, in
practice, fulfills the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine." Id. at 7.
155. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034; see Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,863 (explaining that it seems impossible to "identify [an ozone concentration] level at
which it can be concluded with confidence that no 'adverse' effects are likely to occur");
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638,
65,651 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Dec. 13, 1996) (citing the un-
certainty of "whether or not a threshold concentration exists below which PM-associated
health risks are not likely to occur").
156. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (finding that since the EPA must set
NAAQS at a level adequate to protect the public health and that the only concentrations
of ozone and PM entirely safe to public health is zero, the EPA's NAAQS could techni-
cally be set at any level above zero providing that the EPA "explains the degree of imper-
fection permitted"); see also Cloud & Conerly, supra note 143, at S29 (discussing the
American Trucking decision with regard to the court's determination that the EPA "failed
to establish with sufficient precision [the criteria] by which to judge whether the new eight-
hour standards meet this statutory test").
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standard better satisfied the Clean Air Act's mandate than an ozone
level of 0.07 ppm, 0.09 ppm, or some other level.' 7
After declaring that the revised NAAQS amounted to an unconstitu-
tional exercise of legislative power, the D.C. Circuit compared the EPA's
claims of regulatory authority to past assertions by other federal agen-
cies, especially OSHA's claim of authority in the Lockout/Tagout cases.'
The court concluded that the "latitude EPA claim[ed] ... seems even
broader than that [which] OSHA asserted[,]"' 59 because at least OSHA
confined its discretion "somewhere between [a] maximum feasible strin-
,gency [standard] and some 'moderate' departure from that level."'
Here, the EPA's discretion would allow it to set a "maximum stringency
[that] would send industry not just to the brink of ruin but hurtling over
it, while the minimum stringency may be close to doing nothing at all." '161
Like Lockout/Tagout I, the court examined the special conditions that
had justified the Supreme Court's relaxed application of the nondelega-
tion doctrine in prior circumstances, such as the President's prerogative
to conduct foreign policy or manage national crises." 2 The court found
no such conditions in American Trucking.'3
The court remanded the rules so that the EPA could redraft them and
provided the agency with examples of criteria it could use to tailor a nar-
rower construction of the Clean Air Act.' 4 The court suggested that the
157. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036; see also Cloud & Conerly, supra note
143, at S29 (analyzing the EPA's limits in promulgating NAAQS for ozone).
158. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037.
159. Id. The court noted that the choices the EPA presented itself in finding an air
quality standard were innumerable-from hardly any standard at all to one so odious that
an industry could find itself "hurtling over" the brink of ruin. Id.
160. Id. (noting that the revised rule OSHA promulgated after Lockout/Tagout I,
which was later at issue in Lockout/Tagout H, properly constrained OSHA's discretion);
see also International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ex-
plaining the limits to OSHA's discretion under the OSH Act).
161. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037.
162. See id.; AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 16; supra notes 42-50 and accompa-
nying text (discussing areas historically immune from nondelegation attacks); see, e.g., The
Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 382, 384, 388 (1813), (upholding the President's authority to revive
expired tariffs against Britain and France upon his determination that those countries
were harassing U.S. merchant ships).
163. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037 ("No 'special theories' justifying vague
delegation such as war powers of the President or the sovereign attributes of the delegatee
have been or could be asserted.").
164. See id. at 1038-39 (suggesting that to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine, as well as
previous court decisions that have prohibited the use of cost-benefit analyses for deter-
mining NAAQS, the EPA's discretion in choosing appropriate criteria is limited); see also
Cloud & Conerly, supra note 143, at S29 (mentioning that the court set forth criteria for
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EPA take into account the population affected, as well as the severity
and probability of the harm caused by air pollution.6s In conclusion, the
court advised the EPA to seek remedial legislation from Congress if the
agency could not find an appropriate standard in the Clean Air Act to
channel its discretion) 6
C. The Dissent: Criticizing the Rigid Application of the Nondelegation
Doctrine
In his dissent, Judge Tatel vehemently argued against applying the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate the revised NAAQS.' 6 By re-
manding the EPA rules, Judge Tatel declared that the D.C. Circuit "ig-
nore[d] the last half-century of Supreme Court nondelegation jurispru-
dence." '68 Judge Tatel argued that the EPA's revised NAAQS not only
complied with the Clean Air Act, but were also consistent with the D.C.
Circuit's ten previous decisions that upheld EPA rulemaking authority.69
the EPA to consider in revising its NAAQS regulations).
165. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1039 ("[A]n agency wielding the power over
American life possessed by [the] EPA should be capable of developing the rough equiva-
lent of a generic unit of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and
probability."); cf. Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859 (detailing the factors that the
EPA considered in revising its primary NAAQS for ozone). Those factors included:
(1) Health effects information to inform judgments as to the likelihood that ex-
posures to ambient 03 result in adverse health effects for exposed individuals.
(2) Insights gained from human exposure and risk assessments to provide a
broader perspective for judgments about protecting public health from the risks
associated with 03 exposure.
(3) Specific conclusions with regard to the elements of a standard (i.e., averaging
time, level, and form) that, taken together, would be appropriate to protect pub-
lic health with an adequate margin of safety.
(4) Alternative views of the significance of the effects and factors to be consid-
ered in policy judgments about the appropriate elements of the standard.
Id.
166. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1040 (declaring that if the EPA disagrees
with the court's suggestions for appropriate criteria, the agency can appeal to Congress for
legislation codifying its preferences); see generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 25, at 72-81,
147-150 (arguing that Congress limited the Clean Air Act's effectiveness by choosing to
delegate many hard choices to the EPA); id. at 135-152 (arguing that federal public policy
would be enhanced if Congress spent less time delegating its responsibilities to agencies
and more time making fewer, less complex laws "that harness private arrangements to
take account of varying circumstances").
167. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057-62 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (dissenting only
to Part I of the opinion, which concerned the nondelegation doctrine).
168. Id. at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Clean Air Act has been on the
books for decades and the court has never threatened to void any portion as an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative authority); see, e.g., Automotive Parts Rebuilders Ass'n v.
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Judge Tatel also compared the Clean Air Act's delegated authority to
the language of other statutes that the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
upheld, which gave agencies broad regulatory authority to protect and
promote the "public interest."'"7 For instance, section 303 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, which provided the FCC with broad power to
regulate broadcasting licensing in the "public interest," was upheld by
the Court in the Networks Case.7'
Judge Tatel also addressed the majority's contention that the D.C. Cir-
cuit's holdings in the Lockout/Tagout cases demanded a harder look at
whether the agency articulated an intelligible principle in issuing rules.'
Judge Tatel concluded that the principles constraining the EPA's discre-
tion contained at least the specificity as those sustained by the court in
Lockout/Tagout IH" Further, Judge Tatel argued that section 109 of the
Clean Air Act, which directed the EPA to set NAAQS at levels neces-
sary to protect public health with "an adequate margin of safety," appro-
priately channeled the EPA's discretion because it established NAAQS
at levels low enough to at least ensure a "high degree of protection.,
174
EPA, 720 F.2d 142, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding an EPA rule that implemented a re-
vised Clean Air Act provision that required auto manufacturers to ensure that their vehi-
cles will perform in accordance with applicable emission standards); Lead Indus. Ass'n v.
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding the EPA's authority to issue
NAAQS for lead); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding an
EPA regulation requiring annual reductions in the lead content of gasoline); Amoco Oil
Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding an EPA rule that prohibited
the sale of leaded gasoline to individuals with automobiles equipped with catalytic con-
verters, which helps to reduce exhaust emissions); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462
F.2d 846, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding the EPA's authority to set NAAQS for sulfur
oxides).
170. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057-58 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing the Net-
works Case, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943), which sustained the FCC's power to regulate
broadcast licensing based on the "public interest," and Milk Industry Foundation v.
Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which upheld the authority of the Agricul-
ture Secretary to recognize dairy compacts upon a showing that the "public interest"
would benefit); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)
(upholding the FCC's power to regulate the cable industry as "public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity requires").
171. Networks Case, 319 U.S. at 224-27 (upholding a delegation of power of the FCC
under section 303 of the 1933 Act to regulate the broadcasting industry by promoting the
"public interest"); see also American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
172. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1058-59 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (applying the court's reasoning in Lockout/Tagout II
to its analysis of section 109 of the Clean Air Act).
174. Id. at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory language that bound
OSHA's discretion in promulgating lockout/tagout rules, which the court ultimately up-
held in Lockout/Tagout II, paralleled the language of section 109); see also, e.g., Clean Air
Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1994) (directing the EPA to create NAAQS with crite-
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Judge Tatel further argued that section 109's mandate that the EPA use
the "latest scientific knowledge" when revising ozone and PM attainment
levels further limited the agency's discretion.
175
III. REINVIGORATING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE: ENSURING
GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY FROM GOVERNMENT BY LIMITING
ARBITRARY BUREAUCRATIC POWER
The D.C. Circuit's holding in American Trucking breathed new life
into a constitutional doctrine that many legal scholars once considered
dead or at least comatose.17' Although the court's holding fell short of
returning to the standard articulated in Schechter,77 if the decision stands,
it likely will have a significant impact on future attempts by federal agen-
cies to implement or modify broad regulatory policies." If anything, the
American Trucking decision demonstrates that Lockout/Tagout I and
Benzene were not anomalies. 79 Instead these cases may be the beginning
of a new nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence, in which the federal judi-
ciary looks harder at regulations that are broad in scope and devoid of
ria that "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from
the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities").
175. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1058 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) ("National primary ambient air quality standards... shall be
ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of
the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health.").
176. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining a popular view within the
legal community that regarded the nondelegation doctrine as a dead letter before the
American Trucking decision).
177. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033-34 (remanding the revised NAAQS to
the EPA to develop a constitutional construction of the requisite provisions of the Clean
Water Act to comply with the nondelegation doctrine); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935) (invalidating the NIRA after the Court con-
cluded the act's provisions constituted an excessive delegation of authority by Congress);
see generally News from the Circuits, supra note 105, at 6 ("It was widely, if inaccurately,
reported in the press that the D.C. Circuit had held a portion of the Clean Air Act an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative authority.").
178. See News from the Circuits, supra note 105, at 6 (observing that the court in
American Trucking did not strike down a statute or a regulation, but remanded the rule
and required the agency to develop a narrower construction of the underlying statue); see
also May, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that the doctrine is a "useful antidote to our some-
what eroded separation of powers" principle); Bad Decision on Clean Air, supra note 152,
at Al (warning of the possible consequences if the Supreme Court affirms the American
Trucking decision).
179. See Kriz, supra note 13, at 2167 (noting that the Court has taken increasingly con-
servative stands on constitutional issues and that several other courts are also "flashing
conservative colors").
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any congressionally-prescribed standards.18°
Along with Schechter and Panama Refining, the Court's rather recent
articulation of the nondelegation standard in Benzene served as an ex-
emplar for the majority's holding in American Trucking.181 In Benzene, a
majority of the Court found OSHA's rule limiting benzene in the work-
place to be outside the scope of its delegated power.82 Instead of invali-
dating the underlying statute, as the Court did in Schechter and as Justice
Rehnquist advocated in Benzene,83 the plurality in Benzene construed
the OSH Act narrowly to avoid finding an open-ended delegation.' 4 The
Benzene Court chose to invalidate the rule for being too broad in scope,
not the statute.' Similarly in American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit re-
fused to apply the nondelegation doctrine strictly to strike down the
Clean Air Act or any of its relevant provisions.'86 Instead, the court used
the nondelegation doctrine as a canon of statutory interpretation to con-
strue the Act narrowly.'7 Unlike the Benzene Court, however, the D.C.
Circuit refused to search for an intelligible principle in the Clean Air
Act's ambiguous language. 1  Instead, the appeals court ordered the
EPA to develop another interpretation of the Clean Air Act that con-
fined the agency's discretion.19 This decision refrained from placing the
180. See May, supra note 3, at 20 (advocating for the return of the nondelegation doc-
trine in order to breathe new life into the separation of powers doctrine); Kriz, supra note
13, at 2167 (pondering the possible ramifications of the American Trucking decision, in-
cluding the possibility of the Court embracing the D.C. Circuit's rationale).
181. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
182. Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (5-4 decision) (concluding that Congress could
not have intended to provide OSHA with the unprecedented power that the agency
claimed over domestic industry).
183. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (calling for portions of the OSH Act to be
invalidated as excessive delegations of congressional authority).
184. Id. at 646 ("A construction of the statute that avoids ... [an] open-ended grant [of
legislative authority] should certainly be favored.").
185. Id. at 645 ("In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to as-
sume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented power over Ameri-
can industry.").
186. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 ("[W]e do not read current Supreme Court
cases as applying the strong form of the nondelegation doctrine.").
187. See id. (reasoning that remanding a rule ensures that the courts will "not hold un-
constitutional a statute that an agency, with the application of its special expertise could
salvage").
188. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu-
riam) (deferring to the agency's reasonable interpretation), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724
(U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
189. See id. (concluding that the Court's approach in Benzene, where the Court identi-
fied an intelligible principle within a vague statute, has given way to Chevron deference,
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burden on Congress to make better, less ambiguous law,19 and instead
required the agency to tailor a rule that would limit its own authority.91
The D.C. Circuit's holding in American Trucking also follows the
court's prior decision in Lockout/Tagout L19 Judge Williams authored
the majority opinion in both cases '93 and found unconstitutional delega-
tions of legislative power when the EPA and OSHA claimed to possess
the authority to formulate any standard under the sun-from no stan-
dard at all to a standard so excessive as to force an industry into ruin-94-
either in the name of improved air quality'9' or workplace safety. 96
which requires agencies to make policy decisions). "[J]ust as we must defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, we must defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of a statute containing only an ambiguous principle by which to
guide its exercise of delegated authority." Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984)).
190. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038. The court in American Trucking pro-
vided three rationales for the nondelegation rule: (1) to prevent agencies from exercising
delegated authority arbitrarily; (2) to "enhafice... meaningful judicial review;" and (3) to
ensure that Congress decides important policy choices for the nation. Id. The court stated
that the American Trucking decision served the first two rationales, but not the last. Id.
191. See id. The court reasoned that American Trucking, by providing agencies with
the opportunity to refashion rules that courts consider excessively broad, would advance
the primary rationale for the nondelegation doctrine. See id. As the court articulated:
Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation involve
an unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without constitu-
tional weakness is or may be available, our response is not to strike down the
statute but to give the agency an opportunity to exact a determinate standard on
its own.
Id.; see also News from the Circuits, supra note 105, at 6 (observing that the D.C. Circuit in
American Trucking remanded the revised NAAQS regulations to the EPA to enable the
agency to reinterpret the rule more narrowly).
192. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 (citing the Lockout/Tagout I decision,
which granted OSHA the opportunity to find a "determinate standard" to confine its
claims of broad regulatory authority); see also News from the Circuits, supra note 105, at 6
(noting that the court, in both Lockout!Tagout I and American Trucking, remanded regu-
lations to their respective agencies so that these agencies could refashion rules that comply
with the nondelegation doctrine).
193. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033 (explaining that Judge Williams wrote
Part I of the American Trucking decision); Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (noting that Judge Williams wrote the court's opinion).
194. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037 (observing that the EPA's alleged regu-
latory authority could significantly affect the national economy); Lockout/Tagout 1, 938
F.2d at 1317 ("[The] scope of [OSHA's] regulatory program is immense, encompassing all
American enterprise."). The court in American Trucking required "a 'more precise' dele-
gation than would otherwise be the case" because regulatory programs have the potential
of affecting national commerce on a grand scale. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037
(quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935)).
195. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037 (finding the "EPA's formulation of its
policy judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the concen-
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Another crucial similarity is that both decisions stopped short of va-
cating the respective regulations.' 97 Instead, the court, in each case, re-
manded the rules to allow the agencies to reinterpret their enabling stat-
utes and to confine their own claims of regulatory authority. 98 As the
court articulated in American Trucking, "[i]f the agency develops deter-
minate, binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise the dele-
gated authority arbitrarily."'99
By remanding and not vacating these regulations; the D.C. Circuit, like
the Supreme Court in Benzene, took a middle course that lies to the left
of Schechter and Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Benzene,2 and to
the right of the Networks Case.20' The court's logic seems to balance the
calls for strict adherence to the nondelegation doctrine with practical
considerations 2 such as the institutional advantages agencies have over
Congress in acting expeditiously in crafting detailed solutions to complex
national problems.23 The American Trucking holding suggests that al-
though the court will not permit an excessively broad delegation of leg-
trations yielding London's Killer Fog" for its revised ambient air quality standard).
196. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1318 (finding that OSHA's claimed authority
roamed between a rigorous standard of workplace safety and a relaxed one as a violation
of the nondelegation doctrine); see also News from the Circuits, supra note 105, at 6 (sum-
marizing the American Trucking decision and comparing it to Lockout/Tagout I).
197. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033 (remanding the revised NAAQS to the
EPA to develop a construction of the Clean Air Act that satisfies the nondelegation doc-
trine); Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1326 ("[W]e remand the case to OSHA for further
consideration in light of this opinion.").
198. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038; Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1313
(remanding the rule governing lockout/tagout safety procedures to OSHA for further con-
sideration in light of the court's decision that the rule violated the nondelegation doc-
trine); see also supra note 192 (discussing the results of the American Trucking and Lock-
out/Tagout I decisions).
199. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
200. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence in Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)). In American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit
specifically stated that its holding did not extend as far as Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
in Benzene. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
201. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (up-
holding a broad delegation of regulatory authority to the FCC); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (invalidating the NIRA as an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch).
202. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 25, at 10-11 & n.6 (explaining the difficulty in
finding the line that divides permissible versus impermissible delegations).
203. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT 86-89 (3d ed. 1991) (explaining the need for the delegation of certain
powers to administrative agencies because members of Congress and their staff "lack the
expertise to draft specific language" and cannot predict future events, which are often bet-
ter left to the agencies to fashion timely responses).
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islative power to the agencies, especially one unrestrained by congres-
sionally-imposed standards, neither will the court create an unworkable
situation for Congress by requiring it to codify every substantive policy
proposal'0 In taking a middle-of-the-road approach, the D.C. Circuit
recognized the need for Congress to delegate certain tasks to the agen-
cies where manpower and expertise are abundant and the flexibility ex-
ists to formulate more precise and timely regulations.'O In other words,
the agency still "will make the fundamental policy choices."2°6 At the
same time, however, the court's position respects the democratic princi-
ple of accountability and the separation of powers doctrine' °7 by requir-
ing an agency to provide an intelligible principle and to explain that it
promulgated regulations accordingly.2°s
IV. CONCLUSION
The American Trucking decision, coupled with the D.C. Circuit's ear-
lier Lockout/Tagout I decision and the Supreme Court's Benzene ruling,
provide for a new jurisprudence governing the nondelegation doctrine
and claims of broad rulemaking authority by the federal agencies. These
decisions declare that the federal judiciary will not ignore an administra-
tion's assertion of carte blanche authority to implement expansive new
policies without articulating an "intelligible principle" in a federal statute
that appropriately channels its discretion. Unlike the Schechter decision
204. See Cohen, supra note 103, at 1147.
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as
necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility."); U.S.
CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 71 (explaining that the Court upheld broad
delegations of legislative power because Congress is often incapable of foreseeing or re-
sponding to problems caused by the application of general law to specific situations); cf
Kriz, supra note 13, at 2167 (quoting New York Law School Professor David Schoenbrod,
who interpreted American Trucking to be aimed more against Congress for making a
vague law, rather than the EPA).
206. American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu-
riam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22,
2000) (No. 99-1257).
207. See May, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that more decisions like American Trucking
will hold the government more accountable for public policy decisions). But see Recent
Case, Administrative Law-Nondelegation Doctrine-D.C. Circuit Holds That EPA Con-
struction of Clean Air Act Violates Nondelegation Doctrine, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1051, 1056
(2000) (arguing that the court's decision ultimately serves to promote less accountability
because it arrogates less power to Congress and more power to the judiciary, which is "less
accountable than either of the political branches").
208. See American Trucking, 195 F.3d at 7.
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in which the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute, the nondelega-
tion doctrine is now enforced by remanding regulations for
reformulation when agencies step beyond their traditional rulemaking
function and venture into the realm of lawmaking. Such a modest appli-
cation of the nondelegation doctrine will likely serve to promote political
accountability without ignoring the practical needs of Congress to dele-
gate certain matters to the agencies, which are generally rich in man-
power and technical expertise.
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